A Saudi-Israeli Peace Deal Isn’t Worth It
The New York Times reports that the Biden administration is making a “long-shot bid” to get Israel and Saudi Arabia to normalize relations. Among other things, this step requires overcoming Saudi concerns about Israel’s continued maltreatment of its Palestinian subjects and getting Israel to accept Saudi Arabia’s desire for an advanced civilian nuclear program. You’d think Biden and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken have enough on their hands these days—the war in Ukraine is not going that well, reestablishing constructive relations with China is a challenging task, and they’re apparently trying to reach some sort of informal bargain over Iran’s nuclear program too—but nobody ever accused U.S. foreign policymakers of lacking hubris—oops, I mean, ambition.
The New York Times reports that the Biden administration is making a “long-shot bid” to get Israel and Saudi Arabia to normalize relations. Among other things, this step requires overcoming Saudi concerns about Israel’s continued maltreatment of its Palestinian subjects and getting Israel to accept Saudi Arabia’s desire for an advanced civilian nuclear program. You’d think Biden and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken have enough on their hands these days—the war in Ukraine is not going that well, reestablishing constructive relations with China is a challenging task, and they’re apparently trying to reach some sort of informal bargain over Iran’s nuclear program too—but nobody ever accused U.S. foreign policymakers of lacking hubris—oops, I mean, ambition.
At first glance, pushing Saudi Arabia and Israel to normalize relations seems like a no-brainer. U.S. leaders have long wanted Israel’s neighbors to accept its existence and reach a permanent peace. That impulse (and the related goal of reducing Soviet influence in the region during the Cold War) helped inspire the Carter administration’s shepherding of the 1978 Camp David Accords and subsequent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, as well as the later U.S. effort to broker peace between Israel and Jordan in 1994. Unfortunately, subsequent efforts to achieve a “two-state solution” within the framework of the Oslo Accords were dismal failures, in good part because the United States was not an evenhanded mediator and acted as “Israel’s lawyer” instead. Even so, given the long history of Arab-Israeli enmity, it’s easy to assume that normalization between Riyadh and Tel Aviv would strengthen peace and facilitate regional economic development. Why shouldn’t Washington try to get two of its closest regional partners to come to terms with each other?
In fact, there are two big reasons why this sudden push makes little sense right now.
Read the full piece in Foreign Policy.