Denuclearizing North Korea Is Unrealistic

The Trump administration’s recently released National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the December National Security Strategy (NSS) displayed an unusual pattern on North Korea. Neither document mentioned “North Korean denuclearization,” which has been a core U.S. objective on North Korea since the early 1990s. While the NDS simply highlighted the need to deter North Korea’s evolving nuclear threat, the NSS did not mention North Korea at all. Traditionally, both documents have identified North Korean denuclearization as an important U.S. security goal. 

This trend was further underscored by the U.S. Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby, whose speech during his recent trip to South Korea entirely skipped North Korea and denuclearization. In the past, any such speech would have strongly condemned North Korea’s nuclear development and urged it to denuclearize. 

However, it appears that the Trump administration has not “abandoned” North Korean denuclearization as a goal per se. Last week, Secretary of State Marco Rubio reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to denuclearizing North Korea during his meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun. If Washington is still committed to North Korean denuclearization as Rubio suggests, then why has the language been taken out of both the NDS and the NSS? It remains to be seen, but there are two possible motives.

One is strategic deprioritization. The Trump administration may regard North Korean denuclearization as a low priority that does not warrant a serious commitment. This is possible given the administration’s narrow perception of global security priorities and persistent U.S. fatigue toward North Korea. Facing an array of immediate issues in the Middle East, Europe, other parts of Asia, and now even the Western Hemisphere, the Trump administration may believe it cannot afford to waste energy on North Korean denuclearization, which seems distant and infeasible. Therefore, although denuclearization remains a goal in principle, the administration may intend to approach North Korea primarily as a deterrence problem, as the NDS suggests.