A Reformed U.N. Security Council for a Post-Unipolar Era

Executive Summary

The world is moving today toward two major crises that put the future of international peace and stability — and the institutions that underpin them — at grave risk. First, the global power balance has shifted rapidly over the last several decades, but the institutions and mechanisms of global governance have not been updated to reflect this fact. Second, the world faces a new set of interconnected transnational crises and challenges, which call into question traditional understandings of self-interest, security, and sovereignty — and will require new forms of collaboration and governance to address.

Instead of birthing a multipolar world, a multi-order world risks coming into existence — one in which states will no longer differ over competing interpretations of existing laws and norms, but rather will proffer competing sets of rules and norms. The result would be a hollowing out of crucial universal norms, laws, and institutions, and, by that, a removal of the constraints that have helped make conflicts less likely.

To prevent this outcome, the Quincy Institute’s Better Order Project (BOP) brought together in 2023 and 2024 more than 100 leading scholars, experts, and former officials from more than 40 countries — including all P5 countries and a diverse grouping of states from the Global North and South — to develop a package of proposals and updated norms of international conduct that can help to stabilize an international order in transition. This package of proposals will be published in October 2024.

This advance paper outlines the BOP’s proposals for U.N. Security Council reform, which include the following:

• The size of the U.N. Security Council should be expanded to 23 members in a fashion that creates a “win-win-win” outcome for countries of global influence, countries of regional influence, and smaller countries.

• We propose that three new permanent UNSC members should be elected by the General Assembly: one from Asia, one from Africa, and one from Latin America. 

• The General Assembly should also elect a pool of 20 semi-permanent members, five of whom would serve on the UNSC at any given time. These countries would rotate on and off the Council, serving for two out of every eight years. After three cycles of eight years (i.e., 24 years), the pool of semi-permanent members would be subject to review by way of fresh elections in the GA. The creation of this semi-permanent category would offer compensation for those who failed to be elected to a permanent seat. It would also benefit smaller countries, who would no longer need to compete against 20 influential semi-permanent members (along with the three new permanent members) for an elected seat on the Council. 

• We propose that a permanent member of the UNSC casting a veto must also secure at least one negative vote from any other member of the Council for the veto to hold. If the permanent member were the lone country casting a negative vote, then a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly could overturn the veto. Moreover, a new prerogative should be extended to the permanent Security Council members, allowing them to vote “no” on a resolution without exercising a veto. 

• Additional measures to empower the General Assembly and reduce veto usage are also proposed. For example, the Peacebuilding Commission should be elevated within the U.N. system: Cases that do not directly involve a threat to international peace and security should be transferred to the Commission, which should also be empowered to select the cases it chooses to take on independently. Moreover, going forward, the process for electing a Secretary-General should begin with the selection of a candidate by the General Assembly, followed by the UNSC’s assent.

• Finally, we propose that a Charter review be automatically held every 24 years, coinciding with the conclusion of three cycles of semi-permanent members rotating on and off the Security Council. This would render the task of Charter reform less politically charged, thereby enhancing both democracy within the U.N. system and the resilience of the organization (and the international order) as a whole.

The signatories to this paper hold a range of perspectives on the future multilateralism — a fact visible in the varied compromises that underpin the proposals below. By adding their names to this paper, members of this diverse group are not signaling their endorsement of every word, but rather their broad support for the desirability of its package of recommendations.