New Research: A Trump Nuclear Deal with North Korea and Re-Structuring the U.S.-ROK Alliance
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CONTACT: Jessica Rosenblum, [email protected]
WASHINGTON, DC — A course correction by the Trump administration could mitigate growing security tensions in the Northeast Asia region and lead to long-term peace on the Korean Peninsula to which President Trump has long aspired, according to two research briefs released today by the Quincy Institute.
The new briefs outline a diplomatic, restraint-oriented approach to U.S.-South Korean and U.S.-North Korean relations, which could inform the playbook for restarting the negotiations with North Korea that the Trump administration is reportedly planning for.
The administration should learn from the mistakes of the failed 2018-2019 U.S. North Korea negotiation in order to seize the opportunity for a transformative nuclear agreement with North Korea, argues one of the brief authors, QI Non-Resident Fellow Steven Costello. Pursuing such negotiations would pave the way for a more flexible, proactive, and credible approach to the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance, according to the second brief written by QI research fellow James Park.
Costello’s brief, “Trump Could Get a Win with North Korea This Time, by Taking Lessons from His First Term”, recommends a U.S.-North Korea nuclear agreement in which North Korea agrees to stop the production of new fissile material, nuclear weapons, and long range missiles, in return for the U.S. lifting of non-military sanctions. Such a deal “could set up a diplomatic framework to address and diminish the North Korean nuclear arsenal over the long term”, said Costello.
A nuclear agreement would in turn enable a re-orientation of the U.S.-ROK alliance towards a “deterrence by denial” strategy, as detailed in the corresponding brief from Park, “From Punishment to Denial: Stabilizing Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula”
“The current punishment strategy is provocative and likely to be ineffective”, said Park, referring to the current nature of the U.S.-ROK alliance that relies entirely on the threat of overwhelming military force. Alternatively, deterrence by denial would “enhance the alliance’s proactivity, assuage North Korea’s existential fears of regime destruction, and strengthen the deterrent’s overall credibility.”
“Combined with successful arms control negotiations, this new approach to deterrence would create a more durable foundation for stable coexistence on the Korean Peninsula”, said Park.
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