New Research: What’s the Recipe for a Workable Ukraine-Russia Deal — and How to Get Europe Onboard
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
CONTACT: Jessica Rosenblum, [email protected]
WASHINGTON, DC — As the Trump administration grows “frustrated” with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in its effort to broker negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, two new research briefs by the Quincy Institute explore how U.S. policymakers can overcome serious political and practical obstacles to a durable peace deal.
The briefs, released today, examine the likely structure of a successful deal, and lay out a strategy for achieving a workable framework while securing buy-in from critical U.S. partners in Europe.
A U.S. Peace Plan for Ukraine, by QI Grand Strategy Director George Beebe and Eurasia Director Anatol Lieven, aims to harmonize the complex and competing interests of Ukraine, the U.S., and Russia in negotiations to end the war. In order to construct a peace deal that it’s in all sides’ best interests to adhere to, Beebe and Lieven argue, the U.S. must help develop terms that address Ukrainian concerns about future Russian aggression, while simultaneously laying out a broader political framework that assuages Russia’s fears of strategic encirclement and international isolation. While securing such a deal will not be easy, the alternative is a grim, grinding war that threatens Ukraine’s sovereign status and their future integration into the E.U.
Getting Europe on Board for a Peace Settlement in Ukraine, by Deputy Director of QI’s Better Order Project Zachary Paikin, focuses on one particularly challenging dynamic: genuine fear in European capitals about their security and strategic position after the war’s conclusion. Paikin examines the root of European governments’ status-based and security concerns about war-ending negotiations, and outlines how the Trump administration can quell these anxieties and win support for a negotiated settlement from America’s partners in Europe.
“Although direct Russia–Ukraine talks can play a role in arranging a settlement, very few of the necessary compromises can be struck through bilateral negotiations alone,” Beebe and Lieven said. “The bulk of the incentive and coercive power that can produce Russian and Ukrainian concessions rests with Washington.”
“The Trump administration has attempted to pursue a settlement in Ukraine that addresses some of Russia’s long-standing grievances,” Paikin said. “But the resulting rise in apprehensiveness among Europeans reinforces one of the core lessons of post–Cold War European history: namely, that any order that does not take the stated concerns of all stakeholders into account will result in security for none.”
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