Trump 2.0: Restraint Foreign Policy Recommendations for Trump’s Second Term
Overview
Introduction
During his presidential campaign, President–elect Trump repeatedly warned that the world was on the brink of World War III. This rhetoric represented a clear recognition that we have seen an alarming slide toward increased global conflict in recent years. Dramatically increased tensions have emerged, or outright hot wars have erupted, around the planet from Ukraine to Taiwan, Korea, and the Middle East.
To truly put U.S. interests first, we must not accept the concept of a new global war while urging American participation in it, as some would have us do. Even apart from the risk of nuclear catastrophe, a true slide into World War III would carry immense costs for U.S. domestic revitalization, our security at home, and our global position abroad. Instead, we must pursue a vision of U.S. foreign policy leadership that emphasizes using our national strength to avert global conflict and supports a more stable, peaceful international order that will benefit the United States. This report contains a set of recommendations for the incoming Trump administration designed to support that vision.
The War in Ukraine
Strategic Outlook
Neither side in the Russia–Ukraine War can win unconditionally. Ukraine is too vast and its resistance too determined for Russia to conquer, occupy, and govern the majority of the country. At the same time, Ukraine has shown that it cannot drive Russian forces off the territory it occupies. On the contrary, if the war continues, Ukraine may lose much more territory. Absent a compromise settlement, the war can only lead to direct U.S.–Russian conflict or to Ukraine’s becoming a failed state, with severe implications for European and global stability. A continuation of the war also involves the permanent risk of a broader clash between Russia and NATO.
Similarly, the two warring parties are not capable of reaching a compromise settlement without U.S. leadership. Biden’s policy of refusing to engage Russian President Putin and insisting that Ukraine should decide if and when to seek peace has sacrificed U.S. leverage, saddled Ukrainian President Zelenskyy with the political dangers of initiating negotiations, and needlessly prolonged the war.
Recommendations
- Put U.S. interests first.
U.S. interests should be our north star in negotiations with Russia and Ukraine to end the war. Foremost among these is the establishment of a stable balance of power in Europe underpinned by Europeans themselves that deters, rather than provokes, further Russian aggression.
- Broaden the problem.
Biden has erroneously viewed the war as a conflict over territory, believing Ukraine’s leverage depends on pushing Russian lines back. But for Russia, this war is primarily about defusing the threat posed by the United States and NATO. Putin cannot secure Russia against the 32-member NATO alliance or new U.S. missile technology by winning the war in Ukraine. Broadening discussions to include regional security matters is key to maximizing U.S. leverage. Engaging Russia on NATO expansion and the stationing of offensive missiles in Europe could create Russian openness to E.U. membership for Ukraine and strong, verifiable guarantees against a renewal of Russian aggression against remaining Ukrainian territory.
- Play the China card.
China does not want Russia to lose the war but, at the same time, it wants the war to end because it is undermining its trade with Europe. China is particularly unhappy about North Korea’s growing military involvement in the war, in part because it will encourage greater NATO involvement in Asia. We can exploit this ambivalence by engaging China bilaterally in the search for a peace settlement, which would increase pressure on Putin to compromise. A significant Chinese role in reconstructing Ukraine could also help ensure that Russia will not violate the terms of a settlement and reinvade Ukraine, as Russia has become enormously dependent on its relations with Beijing. The United States should also reach out to major neutral countries like India and Brazil to support a settlement.
NATO and Europe
Strategic Outlook
The United States should return to its European strategy during the Cold War and refocus on securing NATO within its existing borders. For more than 100 years, it has been the great states and economies of Western and Central Europe — not the countries on Europe’s periphery — that have been key to U.S. interests on the European continent. Today, however, these states are showing disturbing signs of political instability and economic weakness, in part because of the costs and economic damage resulting from the Russia–Ukraine War.
The new administration should recognize that further expansion of NATO would not strengthen the alliance but would weaken it. The United States would be drawn into commitments that would involve enormous dangers and no gains in terms of enhanced U.S. security. The American public and political system would be unwilling to support the direct involvement of U.S. troops in wars on the Eurasian periphery, as we have seen in practice in the Russia–Ukraine War.
Recommendations
- Lay the groundwork for European strategic autonomy.
In its policy toward existing U.S. allies in Europe, the Trump administration should aim to move chief responsibility for European security onto European countries themselves. U.S. military planning and national security strategies should make clear the intent to restrict the role of the U.S. military to acting as the ultimate backstop for the defense of NATO member states against outside attack.
The issue of further E.U. enlargement is one for E.U. member states and not the United States. However, E.U. member states should be warned that if they embroil themselves in local conflicts at the European fringe, the United States will not step in to bail them out.
- Refrain from actions that further damage Europe economically, which could undermine the capacity for strategic autonomy and burden sharing.
European economies have been seriously damaged, and political stability has been undermined, by the end of Russian energy supplies as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A trade war between the United States and the E.U. could create significant further harm to European economies and U.S. relations with key allies, as would an attempt to compel Europe to eliminate economic ties with China. A Europe that is diminished economically and wrestling with political instability created by an economic recession would likely be unable to address the challenges and find the political will necessary to pursue strategic autonomy. The Trump administration should move with great caution when it comes to the imposition of exclusionary trade policies and efforts to press Europe to cut off economic ties with China.
China
Strategic Outlook
Over the last four years, the United States has redirected its alliances against China, placed damaging restrictions on Chinese access to technology, and sought to counter China’s goals around the world. Rather than conceding to U.S. demands, China has hardened its defenses and redoubled its capacity to retaliate.
A renewed emphasis on diplomatic exchange has temporarily calmed dangerous rhetoric, yet pressures for conflict are building in both countries and are accompanied by a general complacency about the risks. If U.S. leaders continue to treat China’s existence as a rising power as intrinsically incompatible with U.S. interests, escalating conflict seems inevitable. The potential costs of outright war for the United States and our allies would be enormous. However, tough bargaining over a new mutual understanding could transform the relationship to one of mutual benefit and win direct gains for American security and prosperity.
Recommendations
- Reduce military tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan is the most likely source of conflict between the United States and China. The deterioration of the U.S.–China relationship has badly undermined the trust on both sides that is required to sustain peace and prosperity for Taiwan. U.S. policy should aim for a balance between deterrence and reassurance.
Diplomatically, the United States should revitalize its commitment to its longstanding One China Policy. This involves reiterating U.S. openness to any peaceful, uncoerced resolution of the issue while, at the same time, pressing Beijing to explicitly reject any timeline for unification. In coordination with Taipei, Washington should lay the groundwork for negotiations with Beijing on reduced militarization of the Taiwan Strait and refrain from provocative actions that destabilize the status quo in the area, such as high-profile visits to Taiwan. At the same time, the United States should strengthen military deterrence by continuing to support Taiwan in developing a “porcupine strategy” for deterring Chinese aggression through investments in coastal defense and enhanced resilience.
- Negotiate maritime agreements in the South China Sea.
In the maritime realm, the United States should pursue an agreement with China on safety in bilateral encounters at sea involving coast guard vessels, which would join standing bilateral agreements regarding naval and air force encounters. Washington should also pursue negotiations to lower military tensions in the South China Sea. The United States would reduce its close-in surveillance near Chinese naval bases, as well as its operations near disputed islands and reefs, in exchange for China’s affirmation of freedom of navigation and the legal rights of military vessels at sea. The U.S. should also press China and other claimants to publicly reaffirm that they will not use force to dislodge rivals from any disputed land features.
- Develop more effective crisis prevention and crisis management mechanisms with China.
Deepening U.S.–China antagonism is increasing the possibility of a future crisis. Current crisis management mechanisms are inadequate and require improvement. A presidentially endorsed, two-tier crisis prevention and crisis management dialogue is needed, with one side largely civilian-led and focused on policy-related sources of crises, and the other civilian- and military-led and focused on management issues. Such negotiations should aim to create informal communication channels to clarify the intentions and actions under crisis conditions, a set of crisis prevention and crisis management guidelines, and a professional Crisis Working Group inside key decision-making bodies. Department of Defense funding for such dialogues should be considered during the fiscal year 2026 budgeting process.
- Forge a new economic relationship with China based on reciprocal exchange rather than exclusion.
U.S.–China economic tensions have become one of the most destabilizing problems in the relationship, convincing broad constituencies on both sides that the two countries’ core interests are incompatible while fueling efforts to cut off access to markets and technology. U.S. complaints about Chinese economic statecraft are well-founded, but they do not always recognize the need on the Chinese side to sustain economic growth and development.
An exclusionary response to these problems is unacceptable to Beijing and is likely to damage the competitiveness of U.S. companies as Chinese firms gain an edge in certain sectors. Instead, the United States should take a page out of the Chinese playbook. As President–elect Trump has suggested, we should condition Chinese access to the U.S. market on direct investment to employ U.S. workers and, where applicable, technology transfer to help U.S. businesses. This approach would help U.S. businesses while increasing market competition and reducing geoeconomic conflict.
- Avoid across-the-board “decoupling;” assess U.S.–China links based on their full costs and benefits.
Pressures for a total decoupling and end to contact between the United States and China risk severing connections that are beneficial to U.S. prosperity and technological advancement. They could also harm America’s standing as a free and open society. U.S.–China contacts should be assessed individually based on their actual national security risks and the benefits they could bring.
Korean Peninsula
Strategic Outlook
The security competition between North and South Korea has dramatically deteriorated in recent years in ways that call into question the sustainability of the status quo. Both Koreas have intensified saber-rattling and increasingly oriented their military postures around offensive, rather than defensive, capabilities and strategies.
South Korea has moved toward an overt preemptive posture, threatening to destroy North Korean nuclear facilities and decapitate the North Korean leadership in the event of conflict. North Korea has threatened preventive nuclear first use in the event of conflict and developed low-yield tactical nuclear weapons to make that policy more credible. These military developments, along with the prolonged suspension of military-diplomatic dialogue between the two Koreas, have increased the risk of nuclear escalation. At the same time, growing tensions between the United States, Russia, and China have eroded the capacity for multilateral regional diplomacy.
Recommendations
- Reorient allied deterrence of North Korea toward defensive military capabilities.
The current approach to deterrence by the U.S.–South Korea alliance emphasizes aggressive, offensive threats such as preemptive strikes, overwhelming retaliatory operations, and leadership decapitation. This position comes with serious risks of North Korean overreactions and miscalculations that make nuclear use more likely. Despite North Korea’s gains in nuclear capability, the U.S.–South Korea alliance holds comprehensive military superiority, meaning that any full-scale war would likely be regime-ending for North Korea. When such an overwhelming military mismatch is already clear, piling up further threats of punishment offers little benefit and risks exacerbating threat perceptions and escalatory dynamics.
To enhance stability and lower the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, the United States should work with South Korea to minimize its reliance on offensive military threats toward North Korea and reorient allied deterrence to focus on defensive capabilities and warnings.
- Pursue arms control negotiations with North Korea.
The existing U.S. policy of employing military and economic pressure to fully denuclearize North Korea has been unsuccessful for three decades. The steady increase of military pressure, far from convincing North Korea to commit to denuclearization, has had the opposite effect, motivating it to develop a stronger nuclear deterrent. Due to North Korea’s nuclear advancements, using military threats to compel the regime’s disarmament is becoming riskier and more infeasible. Meanwhile, applying sanctions to pressure North Korea into nuclear talks is increasingly impractical as key players such as Russia and China are reluctant to coordinate with the United States.
Acknowledging the futility of completely eliminating North Korean threats through total disarmament, the incoming Trump administration should work with South Korea to explore a more realistic security negotiation framework. Such a framework would deemphasize the complete denuclearization of North Korea as a goal and instead seek arms control and confidence-building measures to reduce nuclear threats and escalation risks.
East Asian Alliances
Strategic outlook
In the past four years, the United States has doubled down on bilateral and minilateral security cooperation with regional allies, creating a latticework security structure aimed at containing China and regaining a superior military position in the Western Pacific. This approach allowed the United States to enhance joint military interoperability, deploy more strategic assets, and strengthen the overall U.S. forward presence.
Even so, the post–Cold War U.S. approach, aimed at dominating opponents from the outset of hostilities, is increasingly difficult in the face of a deteriorating U.S. fiscal position, the reluctance of regional states to choose between China and the United States, and the fundamental difficulty of projecting U.S. military power across the extensive Pacific Ocean.
A U.S. approach to regional alliances aimed solely at a military organization of allies against China, North Korea, and Russia, without offering positive prospects to rivals through diplomacy, is unlikely to optimize U.S. interests. It will lead the targets of U.S. hostility to increasingly align against U.S. interests, force unpleasant or impractical choices on allies, and undermine prospects for multilateral cooperation in Asia.
Recommendations
- Restructure U.S. regional alliances around a defensive strategy that is strong but smart.
U.S. efforts to reassert complete military dominance in the Western Pacific are unlikely to succeed and will endanger U.S. interests and regional peace and stability. At the strategic level, such efforts contribute to the intensity of the security dilemma unfolding in the region between China and the United States and its allies and partners. At the operational level, a U.S. strategy of control and the massing of potent but vulnerable assets in forward locations, juxtaposed against China’s forward-leaning military strategy, undermine crisis stability by creating incentives for each side to strike first and rapidly escalate in a conflict.
Instead, the United States should empower countries in the region to do more for their defense while restructuring the U.S. force posture to a more defensive, denial-oriented approach. Rather than seeking to exercise dominance or control in the Western Pacific, the United States should seek to deter offensive actions and deny efforts to control the air and seas by China or other nations. This could be done at a lower cost than the current policy by reducing emphasis on forward-deployed ground troops, tactical aircraft, and large surface platforms while increasing reliance on submarines, smaller surface ships, and long-range, conventional weapons delivery systems. The U.S. military should also prioritize attaining more strategic depth with an increased dispersal of its forces in the region.
- Abandon the framework of zero-sum rivalry and pursue an inclusive regional order.
China’s growing military power and economic influence need careful management to deter Chinese coercion and ensure the security of U.S. allies. The United States should continue working closely with allies to strengthen alliance capacities. However, orienting alliances toward a zero-sum, exclusionary structure of rivalry between the United States and China over core security and economic interests is likely to backfire.
The United States needs a diplomatic approach in East Asia that reflects the complexities of a region that desires stable relations with Beijing and Washington, is invested in higher levels of economic integration, and cannot be dominated by either power. The greatest likelihood of inducing nations in the region to invest in their defense — instead of placing the burden on U.S. taxpayers — can be attained if we take an approach that aligns with each nation’s self-perceived interests and does not attempt to force a radical choice between opposing U.S. and Chinese camps.
The Broader Middle East
Strategic outlook
In autumn 2023, shortly before the October 7 attack by Hamas, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan described the Middle East as “quieter than ever.” More than one year later, the region remains at war. Gaza lies in ruins, a functional two-state solution to the Israel–Palestine conflict appears less likely than ever, and the Israel Defense Forces are actively deployed in southern Lebanon and Syria, as well as Gaza. The Houthis have continued to shut down the Red Sea to trade. While marking the fall of a dictator, the overthrow of President Assad in Syria raises possibilities that include an intensification of the civil war in Syria, the establishment of an Islamic–fundamentalist caliphate in the heart of the Middle East, or a transition to a unified and more inclusive Syrian government.
A high possibility remains of a broader war that draws in the United States, especially if Israel and Iran resume their cycle of escalation. However, the United States has significant cards to play to prevent this outcome.
Recommendations
- Take clear steps to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq and Syria.
- Reengage Iran diplomatically.
- Prevent additional escalation between Israel and its neighbors.
Iraq and Syria
Strategic Outlook
The fall of Assad represents a seismic shift in the region. However, it also puts U.S. troops at even greater risk and increases the possibility of the U.S. being drawn into a larger conflict. The administration should act on Trump’s recent statement that this is not our war. The Biden administration has already announced plans to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq, a decision made within the framework of negotiations with the Iraqi government. The new administration should also plan for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria through diplomatic engagement with Syrian factions and Turkey to ensure the protection of the Kurds, to the extent possible. However, the withdrawal of U.S. troops, while potentially a source of leverage for encouraging negotiation between Turkey and Kurdish factions, should move ahead regardless of the outcomes of those negotiations.
Recommendations
- Begin a gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq.
We should end the use of U.S. troops in direct combat operations in Iraq, including their role as forward-deployed advisors. The United States can maintain intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities after most U.S. troops leave by keeping a limited number of advisors under the Office of Security Cooperation and using temporary duty personnel to support the readiness of Iraqi forces through training exercises, military delegations, and combined planning efforts, as is the U.S. practice in other countries to which it provides military assistance.
- Initiate negotiations in anticipation of withdrawing U.S. troops from Syria.
With the ascendancy of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, the question of Iranian influence in the country is no longer a serious issue. As a sectarian movement, HTS is likely to displace any remaining support for ISIS, the stated rationale for U.S. troops in the country. Previous justifications to keep U.S. troops in Syria — valid or not — have withered away. More than ever before, keeping forces in the country exposes U.S. troops to direct attack, which creates a political risk of U.S. escalation and entanglement in a conflict that is not ours.
Israel
Strategic outlook
A ceasefire has yet to be achieved in Gaza and the ceasefire in Lebanon remains fragile, with dozens if not hundreds of violations occurring shortly after the latter’s implementation. Israel currently maintains a military advantage, having decimated Hezbollah’s senior leadership and demonstrated its ability to carry out precision strikes on individuals. In contrast, Iran’s retaliatory actions have been largely an ineffective show of force. However, the sustainability of this military dominance is uncertain. Iran has now set the precedent of striking inside Israeli territory, and it remains unclear if groups such as Hezbollah will regenerate their strength.
To prevent further conflict, the United States and its regional partners must genuinely pursue the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, which is key to achieving a stable Middle East that reduces the risk of U.S. entanglement in its conflicts and helps facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The United States must leverage its influence with Israel to achieve this goal.
Washington must also push for a ceasefire in Gaza and ensure that the ceasefire in Lebanon is sustainable and genuine.
Recommendations
- Limit weapons transfers to Israel, particularly 2,000-pound bombs, in accordance with existing U.S. laws.
There is overwhelming evidence that U.S. weapons transferred to Israel have been used in violations of domestic human rights-related laws and international humanitarian law. Given this, such weapons transfers are illegal under U.S. and international law and should cease until the legal use of those weapons can be ensured.
- Oppose Israeli annexation of the West Bank and Gaza and implement targeted sanctions against individuals involved in illegal settlement expansion.
Israeli annexation of the West Bank without citizenship for its Palestinian inhabitants could result in the legal or de facto expulsion of millions of Palestinian inhabitants to neighboring countries, significantly increasing regional instability. It would also eliminate the territorial basis for any possible solution centered on the establishment of a Palestinian state.
- Use U.S. leverage to discourage Israel from pursuing counterproductive, maximalist goals.
As Israel’s closest ally, major arms supplier, and key political supporter on the international stage, the United States has enormous leverage over Israeli actions. Such leverage could prevent Israel from escalating conflicts with its neighbors that could draw the United States into war. This is especially important in cases in which escalation cannot be pursued without direct U.S. assistance, such as an all-out war between Israel and Iran. This leverage will be ineffective unless the United States demonstrates the willingness to actually use it.
- Reiterate support for a two-state solution and warn Israel that normalization of relations with the Arab world depends on its commitment to this principle.
The lasting normalization of relations with the Arab world depends on the establishment of a Palestinian state. It would also be a historic achievement never attained by previous U.S. administrations.
Iran and the Red Sea
Strategic outlook
The Trump administration has a unique opportunity to negotiate with Iran and potentially move toward more normalized relations. Trump would enter those discussions with leverage because he has shown a willingness to use force against Iran and because he is willing to make a deal with the country. However, the withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action did not effectively slow Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran is backed into a corner, there is a risk that its leaders will attempt to deploy a nuclear deterrent as a last resort. Iran’s current weakness gives the United States a diplomatic opening but, if the opening for diplomacy is not taken, events could spiral out of control.
Negotiations with Iran will also give the United States greater opportunities to peacefully resolve the issue of Houthi strikes in the Red Sea. Moreover, reduced tensions with Tehran will significantly advance Trump’s goal of bringing U.S. servicemen and women home from the Middle East.
Recommendations
- Reengage diplomatically with Iran.
In a “Nixon goes to China” moment, the Trump administration should formulate and present options to the Iranian government for the peaceful integration of Iran into a stable Middle East security architecture and its assistance in resolving, as opposed to fueling, regional conflicts. The administration should seek an interim deal with Iran over its nuclear program before the snapback of sanctions in October of 2025, avoiding Iran’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
- Establish a diplomatic contact group to resolve the Red Sea conflict.
Why is the United States expending billions of dollars to keep the Red Sea shipping lanes open? The United States should abandon its costly and largely ineffective naval strategy in the Red Sea. Instead, it would be more productive to establish a contact group in partnership with the United Nations, including representatives from the Houthis, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, China, Russia, the European Union, and other members of Operation Prosperity Guardian, with the goal of permanently ending Houthi attacks on shipping. The attainment of a ceasefire in Gaza would assist this goal.
Afghanistan
Strategic Outlook
More than three-and-a-half years after foreign troops withdrew from Afghanistan, U.S. policy toward the country remains stagnant. In October 2024, Tom West stepped down as the U.S. special representative for Afghanistan, and no successor has been appointed.
Completely disengaging from Afghanistan would be a serious mistake. Similar U.S. neglect in the 1990s after the Soviet withdrawal ultimately contributed to the events of September 11, 2001. Instead, the United States must establish a sustainable diplomatic approach that reflects Afghanistan’s reduced importance but does not abandon it altogether. Outreach to the Taliban could focus on areas of common interest, such as the fight against ISIS-linked terrorists in the Islamic State of Khorasan, which is at war with the Taliban. Apparent U.S. willingness to reach out to the new regime in Syria, despite its extremist antecedents and links, should be a model for the U.S. approach to the Taliban.
Recommendations
- Empower the Afghanistan Affairs Unit in Doha or appoint a new special representative for Afghanistan to engage in direct diplomacy with the Taliban.
Eliminating the special representative position has both pros and cons. On the one hand, it signals a further decrease in the prioritization of Afghanistan and could complicate interagency coordination. On the other hand, the high-profile nature of the role often involved managing various conflicting stakeholders. The lower-profile Afghanistan Affairs Unit in Doha could adopt a more discreet approach to engaging with the Taliban. Alternatively, the administration could appoint a new special representative with the authority to build relationships and respond to changes within Afghanistan. A supplementary change could be to consider establishing an “Interests Section” in Kabul under the protection of a friendly nation’s embassy.
- Continue providing humanitarian aid to the Afghan people and encourage allies and partners to fulfill their commitments in this regard.
- Clearly communicate to the Taliban the specific steps required to restore access to frozen foreign exchange reserves.
U.S. sanctions on Afghanistan’s foreign exchange reserves have devastated Afghanistan’s economy, affecting civilians and women. Yet, the Biden administration has not offered a clear and feasible pathway for behavioral change or diplomatic concessions to restore access to these reserves. Humanitarian aid alone will not address Afghanistan’s poverty without a functioning economy.
Global South
Strategic Outlook
The global order is becoming less unipolar, not just because of the rise of China but also due to the assertion and increased salience of the Global South. In the future, U.S. global influence and domestic prosperity will depend as much on the Global South as on relations with the great powers. Today, Global South states have options beyond the United States, which requires a proactive approach from Washington. Moreover, some theaters in the developing world, such as the Sahel and the Philippines, have an active U.S. troop presence, which is at risk from the possible outbreak or escalation of conflict.
In other words, ignoring the Global South is not sustainable from the point of view of U.S. security and prosperity. When global crises such as pandemics or financial instability arrive — or better still, in order to prevent them — engaging with the Global South’s middle powers, in particular, will be even more important. Thus, the United States needs to pay attention to its relationship with the Global South. The emphasis ought to be on key middle powers, such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, India, and Indonesia, and developing countries or regions where U.S. troops are currently deployed, such as the Sahel and the Philippines.
Global South states aim to rise and “catch up” in economic and status terms with the wealthier world and prefer multialignment or nonalignment with respect to the great powers. Global South states generally pursue their own interests and seek better relations with the United States independent of their relations with other powers.
The United States could achieve productive relations with the Global South by identifying common interests and forging win-win deals rather than pushing self-defeating ideological preferences or seeking to rewire the domestic economies of these states. Ideological pursuits or entanglements in nonvital conflicts could also blow back, risk U.S. troops, and hurt American interests.
Recommendations
- Pull back from over-militarization and bloc formation and accept the reality of the Global South’s new nonalignment.
While the United States often views the Global South in terms of whether it is aligned with the United States or China in “strategic competition,” these states do not view the world that way. Their priority is to rise in the international system by leveraging all major power relationships. The United States should avoid framing the meta-region primarily through the lens of U.S. rivalry with Russia and China and deemphasize bloc formation or militarization in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. While allies and partners in the Global South should be supported in terms of their legitimate defense needs, pushing for confrontation with Russia or China, especially through direct interventions and military bloc formation — such as in the Sahel and the Philippines/South China Sea — will only yield limited success with some states and could lead to a rise in anti–U.S. political sentiments in others.
A smarter strategy would be to focus on these relationships chiefly in terms of their bilateral content, aiming to achieve good deals for the United States in sustainable ways. This implies that the deals should benefit the Global South states as well.
- Pull back on the reflexive and heavy use of unilateral sanctions.
Unilateral sanctions, particularly their secondary variant, are deeply resented by most Global South states. Secondary sanctions are also illegal under international law. In recent decades, Washington has used the sanctions tool heavily and often reflexively, without a clear strategy for achieving its objectives. At this point, such sanctions are causing major humanitarian suffering as well as pushing Global South states to try and de-dollarize. Though their efforts are unlikely to bear fruit soon, this speaks to the unsustainable nature of U.S. strategy, as Russia and China rarely use such an approach to further their interests.
After a careful evaluation of the costs and benefits, Washington ought to pull back on most unilateral sanctions and only employ the tool sparingly. As part of this analysis, the costs should include the impacts of sanctions on ordinary citizens of the target state.
- Pursue a strategy that is based on energizing trade and investment with the Global South’s growing middle powers.
Most Global South states are not looking for handouts or aid, but investment and trade. Many of these states are growing faster than the United States and host a growing, younger population and abundant natural resources.
Investing in and supporting U.S. firms is a good thing, and there is space for a well-designed industrial policy that prioritizes the well-being of U.S. domestic manufacturing. At the same time, a more open global trading and investment regime tends to benefit all parties. Washington should meet the Global South part of the way in energizing more trade and investment. This should be pursued bilaterally and, preferably, by revitalizing the World Trade Organization–based system.
Democratizing Foreign Policy
Strategic outlook
All too often, U.S. foreign policy is driven by special interests rather than the interests of the nation as a whole. Foreign powers and government contractors spend billions of dollars every year on lobbying, public relations, and other methods to steer U.S. foreign policy in more militarized directions. We must democratize U.S. foreign policy to ensure that the will of the people, not war profiteers, guide U.S. international affairs. To do that, we have to foster a more informed and robust citizen engagement with foreign affairs and build greater public support for diplomacy and restraint by exposing the private, corporate, and foreign interests that promote militaristic U.S. policies. We must also work closely with Congress and the media to expose the conflicts of interest inherent in many of the foreign policy experts they rely on.
Recommendations
- Request think tanks disclose all corporate and foreign government funding sources.
Unless and until legislation passes to require think tank funding transparency, the executive branch should formally request that think tanks publicly disclose this information on their websites. In 2020, during Trump’s first term, his secretary of state released a statement that read: “To protect the integrity of civil society institutions, the [State] Department requests henceforth that think tanks and other foreign policy organizations that wish to engage with the department disclose prominently on their websites funding they receive from foreign governments, including state-owned or state-operated subsidiary entities.” However, in 2023 the Biden administration stopped requesting this level of disclosure, with no explanation.
- Close the revolving door between government and lobbying firms and contractors.
The revolving door, in which members of Congress, their staff, and high-ranking Pentagon officials transition almost instantly from serving the government to lobbying it, enriches the powerful while endangering U.S. national security. Elon Musk saw the dangers of the revolving door firsthand in 2014 when his firm, Space-X, was repeatedly denied U.S. government contracts. “Essentially we’re asking them to award a contract to a company where they are probably not going to get a job, against a company where their friends are,” Musk explained to The Washington Post.
A substantial cooling-off period between moving from the Pentagon or Congress to the arms industry would mean that key contacts with former colleagues would be less useful as personnel in the executive branch turn over. The administration should require, as a condition of employment, cooling-off periods for all relevant national security-related positions of at least four years, extended from the current norm of one to two years.
- To prevent the politicization of “foreign influence” charges, make clear that the issue of concern is a true agency relationship with a foreign government.
Since 2016, we have seen substantial politicization of vague and unclear charges of “foreign influence” in an attempt to discredit domestic political opponents. Such efforts were frequently made against Trump and his Republican supporters. To prevent such partisan misuse of national security claims, the administration should promulgate regulations and support legislation that makes clear that the application of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and actions by the intelligence community are aimed at cases where there is a true agency relationship — that is, funding by a foreign principal that is granted or withheld based on support for positions selected by the foreign funder. Further, such enforcement should take place on an impartial basis against all sources of foreign influence.
Topics
Entities
Authors
George Beebe is director of grand strategy at the Quincy Institute. He spent more than two decades in government as an intelligence analyst, diplomat, and policy advisor, including as director of the CIA’s Russia analysis and as a staff advisor on…
Anatol Lieven is the director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He was formerly a professor at Georgetown University in Qatar and in the War Studies Department of King’s College London.
Jake Werner is acting director of the East Asia Program at the Quincy Institute. His research focuses on US–China economic relations and the global economy. He received his doctorate in history from the University of Chicago.
James Park is a research associate at the Quincy Institute’s East Asia Program. His research interests include South Korean foreign policy and domestic politics, Chinese security issues, and U.S. policy vis-à-vis East Asia.
Trita Parsi is the executive vice president of the Quincy Institute. He is an award-winning author and the 2010 recipient of the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order.
Adam Weinstein is deputy director of the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute. His research focuses on security, trade, and rule of law in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He is a veteran of the Marine Corps and the war in…
Sarang Shidore is director of the Global South program at the Quincy Institute. He is also a member of the adjunct faculty at George Washington University, where he teaches a class on the geopolitics of climate change.
Ben Freeman is director of the Democratizing Foreign Policy program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. His work focuses on how foreign governments seek to influence American government and politics. This work builds upon his book, The Foreign Policy…
Marcus Stanley is director of studies at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Prior to joining the Quincy Institute, he spent a decade at Americans for Financial Reform. He has a PhD in public policy from Harvard, with a focus…
